The Bomber In British Strategy-Simon J. Ball 1995-09-20 Between 1945 and 1960, Great Britain constructed a substantial nuclear-armed bomber force. The creation of this force had ramifications that extended well beyond the confines of military policy. The process played a large part in defining relations with the United States, and the belief that these bombers could replace conventional forces convinced successive British governments that Great Britain could maintain a significant global military role. These assumptions were developed and reinforced by a continuing discourse about strategy within the British defense establishment. The Royal Air Force was the champion of the bomber force and played a major part in shaping the outcome of this discourse. Drawing on both archives and oral testimony, this book analyzes British strategic discourse and its influence on British foreign policy in the early decades of the Cold War.

Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare-Tami Davis Biddle 2009-01-10 A major revision of our understanding of long-range bombing, this book examines how Anglo-American ideas about "strategic" bombing were formed and implemented. It argues that ideas about bombing civilian targets rested on--and gained validity from--widespread but substantially erroneous assumptions about the nature of modern industrial societies and their vulnerability to aerial bombardment. These assumptions were derived from the social and political context of the day and were maintained largely through cognitive error and bias. Tami Davis Biddle explains how air theorists, and those influenced by them, came to believe that strategic bombing would be an especially effective coercive tool and how they responded when their assumptions were challenged. Biddle analyzes how a particularly coherent interpretation of the World War I experience, together with the RAF's organizational interests, shaped interwar debates about strategic bombing and preserved conceptions of its potentially revolutionary character. This flawed interpretation as well as a failure to anticipate implementation problems were revealed as World War II commenced. By then, the British and Americans had invested heavily in strategic bombing. They saw little choice but to try to solve the problems in real time and make long-range bombing as effective as possible. Combining narrative with analysis, this book presents the first-ever comparative history of British and American strategic bombing from its origins through 1945. In examining the ideas and rhetoric on which strategic bombing depended, it offers critical insights into the validity and robustness of those ideas--not only as they applied to World War II but as they apply to contemporary warfare.

The Beginnings of Strategic Air Power-Neville Jones 2012-11-12 Using official records, the author traces the origins and early development of strategic bombing, and examines its organs in the operations and staff planning of the First World War. The experiences of the First World War should have been a valuable legacy to those who devised the 'counter offensive' strategy in the years between the war. Unfortunately the lessons learnt were soon forgotten and many of the operational and technical problems which the planners had begun to tackle in 1918 were not even seen to exist by the Air Staff during the 1920s and early 1930s. The Bombers and the Bombed-Richard Overy 2014-02-20 The ultimate history of the Allied bombing campaigns in World War II Technology shapes the nature of all wars, and the Second World War hinged on a most unpredictable weapon: the bomb. Day and night, Britain and the United States unleashed massive fleets of bombers to kill and terrorize occupied Europe, destroying its cities. The grisly consequences call into question how "moral" a war the Allies fought. The Bombers and the Bombed radically overturns our understanding of World War II. It pairs the story of the Allied front line in the Allied air war alongside the political context that shaped their strategic bombing campaigns, examining the responses to bombing and being bombarded with renewed clarity. The first book to examine thoroughly not only the well-known attacks on Dresden and Hamburg but also the significance of the firebombing on other fronts, including, among others, where the crisis was far more severe than anything experienced in Germany, this is Richard Overy's finest work yet. It is a rich reminder of the terrible military, technological, and ethical issues that relentlessly drove all the war's participants into an abyss.

The Rise and Fall of the French Air Force-Greg Baughen 2018-04-17 On 10 May 1940, the French possessed one of the largest air forces in the world. On paper, it was nearly as strong as the RAF. Six weeks later, France had been defeated. For a struggling French Army looking desperately for air support, the skies seemed empty of friendly planes. In the decades that followed, the debate raged. Were there unused stockpiles of planes? Were French aircraft really so inferior? Baughen examines the myths that surround the French defeat. Air policy was guided by radical theories that predicted air power alone would decide future wars. Baughen traces some of the problems back to the very earliest days of French aviation. He describes the mistakes and bad luck that dogged the French efforts to modernise their air force in the twenties and thirties. He examines how decisions made just months before the German attack further weakened the air force. Yet defeat was not inevitable. If better use had been made of the planes that were available, the result might have been different.

Bomber Offensive-Arthur Harris 2005-03-01 Sir Arthur Harris - Bomber Harris - remains the target of criticism and vilification by many, while others believe the contribution he and his men made to victory is grossly undervalued. He led the men of Bomber Command in the face of appalling casualties, had fierce disagreements with higher authority and enjoyed a complicated relationship with Winston Churchill. Written soon after the close of World War 2, this collection of Sir Arthur Harris's memoirs reveals the man behind the Allied bombing offensive that culminated in the destruction of the Nazi war machine but also many beautiful cities, including Dresden. Strategy for Victory-David Ian Hall 2008 Strategy for Victory: The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919-1943 examines the nature of the inter-Service crisis between the British Army and the RAF over the provision of effective air support for the army in the Second World War. Material for this book is drawn primarily from the rich collection of documents at the National Archives (UK) and other British archives. The author makes a highly original point that Britain's independent RAF was in fact a disguised blessing for the Army and that the air force's independence was in part a key reason why a successful solution to the army's air support problems was found. The analysis traces why the British army went to war in 1939 without adequate air support and how an effective system of support was organized by the RAF. As such, it is the first scholarly survey of the origins and development of British air support doctrine and practice during the early years of the Second World War. The provision of direct air support was of central importance to the success enjoyed by Anglo-American armies in the latter part of the Second World War. First in North Africa, and later in Italy and North-West Europe, American, British and Empire armies fought most if not all of their battles with the knowledge that they enjoyed unassailable air superiority throughout the battle area. This advantage, however, was the product of a long and bitter dispute between the British Army and the Royal Air Force that began at the end of the First World War and continued virtually unabated until it was resolved in late 1942 and early 1943 when the 2nd Tactical Air Force was created. Battlefield experience and, in particular, success in North Africa, combined with the hard work, wisdom and perseverance of Air Marshals Sir Arthur Tedder and Arthur Coningham, the active co-operation of General Bernard Montgomery, and the political authority of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, produced a uniquely British system that afforded the most comprehensive, effective and flexible air support provided by any air force during the war. The book is divided into two equal parts of five chapters. Part one surveys how the British Army went to war in 1939 without adequate air support, and part two explains how an effective system of air support was organized by the middle years of the war. The analysis traces Britain's earliest experience with aircraft in the Great War 1914-1918, the inter-war period of doctrinal development and inter-Service rivalry, and the major campaigns in France and the Middle East during the first half of the Second World War when the weaknesses in Army-RAF co-operation were first exposed and eventually resolved. As such, it is the first scholarly survey of the origin and development of
British air support doctrine and practice during the early years of the Second World War.

Deterrence And Effectiveness Of WWII Strategic Bombing Strategy-Colonel T. Tracey Goetz 2014-08-15 With the collapse of France in 1940, American (US) and British (UK) leadership became keenly aware that the continued security of their nations required the defeat of the Axis powers, particularly Germany. The Allies chose a strategy utilizing a combination of various military actions, most notably a combined bomber offensive (CBO). The CBO would be carried out through a combination of US daylight precision and UK night area bombing. The purpose of this paper is to show why the Allies chose this strategy and evaluate its success. To accomplish this task, the paper will first describe the events that brought about the conflict and the strategy. Crowl’s Questions are used as a framework to analyze the factors that influenced strategy development and adoption. The paper will then discuss how the Allies chose this path. This is followed by a detailed description of the campaign. The principles of war (mass, objective, offensive, maneuver, surprise, security, simplicity, unity of command, and economy of force) are accepted as proven methods for employing forces in combat and are used to evaluate the CBO’s effectiveness. The paper closes with a summary of the findings and doctrinal implications. The paper will show the Allies adopted US daylight precision and UK night area bombing based on leadership’s belief that it could most effectively reduce Germany’s means of war and hasten its earliest possible defeat. The Allies successfully achieved this objective primarily through adherence to the principles of mass, objective, offensive, and economy of force.

THE WAR IN THE AIR-2017-04-23 The reader should grasp clearly the date at which this book was written. It was done in 1907: it appeared in various magazines as a serial in 1908 and it was published in the Fall of that year. At that time the aeroplane was, for most people, merely a rumour and the “Sausage” held the air. The contemporary reader has all the advantage of ten years’ experience since this story was imagined. He can correct his author at a dozen points and estimate the value of these warnings by the standard of a decade of realities. The book is weak on anti-aircraft guns, for example, and still more negligent of submarines. Much, no doubt, will strike the reader as quaint and limited but upon much the writer may not unreasonably plume himself. The interpretation of the German spirit must have read as a caricature in 1908. Was it a caricature? Perhaps the German General Staff showed Prince Schwarzenberg the plan for a large-scale air strike on the civilian population of London and other cities, which would cause tremendous destruction and massive casualties. The nation would be shattered in a matter of days or weeks, before it could fully mobilize for war. Defeat, decline, and economic catastrophe would follow. This theory of the knock-out blow from the air solidified into a consensus during the 1920s and by the 1930s had largely become an orthodoxy, accepted by pacifists and militarists alike. But the devastation feared in 1938 during the Munich Crisis, when gas masks were distributed and hundreds of thousands fled London, was far in excess of the damage wrought by the Luftwaffe during the Blitz in November 1940.
1940 and 1941, as terrible as that was. The knock-out blow, then, was a myth. But it was a myth with consequences. For the first time, The Next War in the Air reconstructs the concept of the knock-out blow as it was articulated in the public sphere, the reasons why it came to be so widely accepted by both experts and non-experts, and the way it shaped the responses of the British public to some of the great issues facing them in the 1930s, from pacifism to fascism. Drawing on both archival documents and fictional and non-fictional publications from the period between 1936 and 1945, when aviation was first perceived as a threat to British security, and 1941, when the Blitz ended, and it became clear that no knock-out blow was coming, The Next War in the Air provides a fascinating insight into the origins and evolution of this important cultural and intellectual phenomenon.

Air Raid-Tom McGowen 2001-01-01 Offers a history of aerial bombardment, from the first hand-held bombs to the firebombing of World War II, including the use of atomic bombs and discussing the strategy by the Germans and the rationale of the response by the Allies.

Air Warfare-Peter Gray 2015-11-19 Air Warfare provides an introduction to the subject's theory, history and practice. As well as delivering an up to date look at the strategy, and historiography of air power, Peter Gray explores the theories behind air power and looks at the political, legal and moral dimensions of the application of air power. Topics covered include: - Key military strategists and their legacy - Air power's strategic effects - Leadership, management and command - Tactics, technology and operations The book draws on primary sources including official narratives and published reports, examines key thinkers in the study of air power, and discusses topics such as concepts of warfare as an art or science, cultural perceptions of air power, and the experience of being an airman. With its broad scope and thorough coverage of a range of key topics, Air Warfare takes air power beyond the study of individual campaigns, or controversies, providing a multi-disciplinary approach to air power studies.

Leaping The Atlantic Wall - Army Air Forces Campaigns In Western Europe, 1942-1945 [Illustrated Edition]-Edward T. Russell 2015-11-06 Includes 20 illustrations On December 7, 1941, the Japanese empire attacked the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. In Hawaii, Germany's dictator, Adolf Hitler, fulfilling a treaty with Japan, declared war on the United States. Having dealt with that act the developing alliance between the United States and Great Britain, Hitler's Third Reich speeded construction of a formidable "Atlantic wall," to protect the exposed beaches of the Netherlands, Belgium, and northern France. This rampant was a massive system of fortifications, obstacles, and warning centers intended to thwart an Anglo-American invasion of Nazi-occupied Western Europe. Breaching the Atlantic wall of Hitler's "Fortress Europe" was the major strategic problem confronting British and U.S. military planners in late 1941. The two Allies based their offensive strategy on the belief that Germany was the strongest of the Axis powers and therefore should be defeated first. An air offensive against Germany was an important component of this strategy. Properly conducted, it would enable the Allies to leap the Atlantic wall and damage the industrial foundations of the Third Reich well before Allied ground troops penetrated the coastal barrier. The Allies held the air forces in the Pacific and Far East to a minimum and concentrated on building a formidable force on English soil capable of striking the Nazi heartland and, eventually, of supporting a cross-channel invasion and a victorious Allied advance across Europe.

Eight Days at Yalta-Diana Preston 2020-02-04 While some of the last battles of WWII were being fought, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin—the so-called "Big Three"—met from February 4-11, 1945, in the Crimean resort town of Yalta. Over eight days of bargaining, bombast, and intermittent bonhomie, while Soviet soldiers and NKVD men patrolled the grounds of the three palaces occupied by their delegations, they decided, among other things, on the endgame of the war against Nazi Germany and how a defeated and occupied Germany should be governed, on the postulates of the so-called United Nations, on the prize of victory, on the superstate of the future, on the constitutions of the nation, on the people of Britain, on the new borders of Poland, and on the spheres of influence prevailing in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and Greece. With this transcription of the memoirs of the three central figures of the conference, the renowned historian of the Second World War, as Averell Harriman, Anthony Eden, and Andrei Gromyko, to Churchill's clear-eyed secretary Marian Holmes and FDR's insightful daughter Anna Boettiger—Diana Preston has, on the 75th anniversary of this historic event, crafted a masterful and vivid chronicle of the conference that created the post-war world, out of which came decisions that still resonate loudly today. Ever since, who "won" Yalta has been debated. Three months after the conference, Roosevelt was dead, and right after Germany's surrender, Churchill wrote to the new president, Harry Truman, of an "iron curtain" that was now "drawn upon [the Soviets'] front." Knowing his troops controlled eastern Europe, Stalin's judgment in April 1945 thus speaks volumes: "Whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system."

Planning Armageddon-Len Scott 2013-05-13 Planning Armageddon provides the first detailed account of Britain's Command, Control, Intelligence and Communications infrastructure. A central theme of the book is the British-American atomic relationship and its implications for NATO strategy. Based on the recollections of officials and military officers in both Britain and the United States and employing recently declassified government documents, Planning Armageddon presents a systematic analysis of British involvement in nuclear planning from Hiroshima to the construction of Polaris. At the same time, it provides an important examination of the operational weaknesses of the British nuclear deterrent and the potential hazards presented by unwarranted secrecy. Strategy for Defeat-Williamson Murray 1983 Dr. Murray's book provides a detailed analytical study of the development of the Luftwaffe. The author takes an in-depth look at the "easy war" (1939-40) and the turn toward Russia in Operation Barbarossa. Dr. Murray investigates the war of attrition from 1942 through early 1944 and the reasons for the final demise of the Luftwaffe from April through September 1944. The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany: I, Preparation-Charles Kingsley Webster 2006 The theme of this first of four volumes of the official British history of the Second World War devoted to the RAF's strategic bomber offensive against Germany is in its sub-title Preparation. Beginning with the lessons learned from air bombing in its infancy during the Great War, the authors divide their book into three parts: strategy; operations; perceptions and results. No aspect of Britain s role in the war, as the authors acknowledge in their preface, has been and remains more controversial than the air war against German cities. These books, the product of ten years research, are an essential repository of facts, based on official documents - then still secret - in the archives of the Cabinet Office, the Air Ministry and Bomber Command. Other papers on which this account is based include the official despatches of the Chief of Bomber Command, Sir Arthur Harris, the writings and interrogations of Germany s armaments minister, Albert Speer, and papers from the Air Historical Branch. In addition to written sources, the authors consulted many of the air chiefs, scientists and other officials who directed and led the offensive. - including those of the USAF. From an initial reluctance to bomb German forests because they were private property, Britain s bombing offensive, one of the few weapons available to it in the dark early days of the war, escalated after the battles of France and Britain and the opening of the Luftwaffe s Blitz on Britain, from precision targets to mass area bombing of cities. This book takes the story up to the opening of 1943 with the first thousand bomber raids, the creation of the Pathfinder Force, and the beginning of day ground bombung. The narrative is accompanied by diagrams, six maps and 29 photos of the leading figures behind the offensive, the aircraft involved, and before and after pictures of the raids and their results. The calm, dispassionate book is essential reading for all who are interested in a subject which remains burningly relevant in the 21st century.

Linking Logistics and Operations-Jacob A. Stockfisch 1991 During recent years, through its Logistics Concept of Operations (LOGCONOPS), the Air Force has recognized this need, and that the uncertainty of wartime operations generates unpredictable support demands. This condition calls for linking operations and logistics support by management and command. This Note distills from a survey of World War II literature two kinds of information that makes a compelling case for LOGCONOPS and provides insight on how to implement it. The first describes the linkage between operations and logistics that tacticians and logisticians faced and how it was permeated by uncertainty. The second describes how management initiatives met the resulting problems. Three World War II uses of American and British airpower are recounted: the tactical air support in the European ground war; the tactical air support in the Pacific amphibious war; and the strategic air offensive against Germany and Japan. Aspects of enemy strategy and air force behavior that motivated friendly initiatives are also described.
The Command of the Air-Giulio Douhet 2009-08-26 The Italian General Giulio Douhet reigns as one of the twentieth century's foremost strategic air power theorists. As such scholars as Raymond Flugel have pointed out, Douhet's theories were crucial at a pivotal pre-World War II Army Air Force institution, the Air Corps Tactical School.

The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1940-1943-Matthew Powell 2016-09-10 This book explores the development of tactical air power in Britain between 1940 and 1943 through a study of the Royal Air Force's Army Co-operation Command. It charts the work done by the Command during its existence, and highlights the arguments between the RAf and Armies on this contentious issue in Britain. Much is known about the RAf both in the years preceding and during the Second World War, particularly the exploits of Fighter, Bomber and Coastal Commands, yet the existence of the RAf's Army Co-operation Command is little-known. Through extensive archival research, Matthew Powell maps the creation and work of the RAf's Army Co-operation Command through an analysis of tactical air power developments during the First World War and inter-war periods, highlighting the debates and arguments that took place between the Air Ministry and the War Office.

"Are We Beasts?"-Christopher C. Harmon 1991

The Bombing War-Richard Overy 2013-09-26 The ultimate history of the Blitz and bombing in the Second World War, from Wolfson Prize-winning historian and author Richard Overy The use of massive fleets of bombers to kill and terrorize civilians was an aspect of the Second World War which continues to challenge the idea that Allies specifically fought a 'moral' war. For Britain, bombing became perhaps its principal contribution to the fighting as, night after night, exceptionally brave men flew over occupied Europe destroying its cities. The Bombing War radically overhaul's our understanding of the War. It is the first book to examine seriously not just the most well-known parts of the campaign, but the significance of bombing on many other fronts - the German use of bombers on the Eastern Front for example (as well as much newly discovered material on the more familiar 'Blitz' on Britain), or the Allied campaigns against Italian cities. The result is the author's master-piece - a rich, gripping, picture of the Second World War and the terrible, technological and ethical issues that came with it. It is the first book to put the history of he second world war this century Richard J Evans, Guardian 'Monumental ... this is a major contribution to one of the most controversial aspects of the Second World War ... full of new detail and perspectives ... hugely impressive' James Holland, Literary Review 'This tremendous book does what the war describes signally failed to do. With a well-thought-out strategy and precision, it delivers maximum force on its objectives ...

The result is a masterpiece of the historian's art 'The Times 'It is unlikely that a work of this scale, scope and merit will be surpassed' Times Higher Education 'What distinguishes Mr Overy's account of the bombing war from lesser efforts is the wealth of narrative detail and analytical rigour that he brings to bear' Economist 'Excellent ... Overy is never less than an erudite and clear-eyed guide whose research is impeccable and whose conclusions appear sensible and convincing even when they run against the established trends' Financial Times 'Hard to surpass. If you want to know how bombing worked, what it did and what it meant, this is the book to read' Times Literary Supplement About the author: Richard Overy is the author of a series of remarkable books on the Second World War and the wider disasters of the twentieth century. The Dictators: Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia won both the Wolfson Prize for History and the Hessell-Tiltman Prize. He is Professor of History at the University of Exeter. Penguin publishes 1939: Countdown to War, The Morbid Age, Russia's War, Interrogations, The Battle of Britain and The Dictators. He lives in London.

Strategy For Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933-1945 [Illustrated Edition]-Williamson Murray 2015-11-06 Includes the Aerial Warfare In Europe During World War II illustrations pack with over 200 maps, plans, and photos. This book is a comprehensive analysis of an air force, the Luftwaffe, in World War II. It follows the Germans from their prewar preparations to their final defeat. There are many disturbing parallels with our current situation. Based on a lifetime of military research, he asks us to read it caution.

Wings of Judgment-Ronald Schaffer 1988-09-29 World War II--"the good war"--is here viewed from a new angle of vision, one that sheds fresh light on how major decisions were reached. More than just a book on the strategy and outcome of American bombing in World War II, Wings of Judgment tells about choices in war, decisions that determined whether hundreds of thousands of people lived or died and whether famous cities and great monuments of military and cultural civilization or were destroyed. It is about the bombing of Dresden and Berlin and of dozens of cities and towns all over Germany and about the preservation of Rome and Florence. It is about the incineration of Tokyo, the bombing of Hiroshima, and the sparing of one of Japan's most beautiful and holy places, the city of Kyoto. Describing U.s. air raids that terrified inhabitants of enemy cities and countries of enemy-occupied countries, it raises serious questions about the military and moral effects of American bombing. It also tells of American efforts to avoid killing civilians needlessly. Taking us behind the scenes at military headquarters, Schaffer shows that even the toughest warriors occasionally found themselves offering moral arguments for their actions, arguing that they were made right by enemy atrocities, by the justness of the Allied cause, and by the numbers of lives of American servicemen that Allied bombing might save.

Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany-Senior Research Fellow Charles Webster 2006-05-01 The theme of this first of four volumes of the official British history of the Second World War devoted to the RAf's strategic bomber offensive against Germany is in its sub-title Preparation . Beginning with the lessons learned from air bombing in its infancy during the Great War, the authors divide their book into three parts: strategy; operations; appreciations and results. No aspect of Britain's role in the war, as the authors acknowledge in their preface, has been and remains more controversial than the air war against German cities. These books, the product of ten years of research, are an essential and independent source based on official documents - then still secret - in the archives of the Cabinet Office, the Air Ministry and Bomber Command. Other papers on which this account is based include the official despatches of the Chief of Bomber Command, Sir Arthur Harris, the writings and interrogations of Germain's armaments minister, Albert Speer, and papers from the Air Historical Branch. In addition to written sources, the authors consulted many of the air chiefs, scientists and other officials who directed and led the offensive. - including those of the USAF. From an initial reluctance to bomb German forests because they were private property, Britain's bombing offensive, one of the few weapons available to it in the dark early days of the war, escalated after the battles of France and Britain and the opening of the Luftwaffe's Blitz on Britain, from precision targets to mass area bombing of cities. This book takes the story up to the opening of 1943 with the first thousand bomber raids, the creation of the Pathfinder Force, and the beginning of daylight bombing. The narrative is accompanied by diagrams, six maps and 20 photos of the leading figures behind the offensive, the aircraft involved, and before and after pictures of the raids and their results. This calm, dispassionate book is essential reading for all who are interested in a subject which remains burningly relevant in the 21st century.
The Leadership, Direction and Legitimacy of the RAF Bomber Offensive from Inception to 1945-2013-05-31 An examination of the strategic leadership and legitimacy of the RAF bombing offensive against Germany in the Second World War.

Bomber Command-Max Hastings 2013-09-15 Bomber Command's air offensive against the cities of Nazi Germany was one of the most epic campaigns of World War II. More than 56,000 British and Commonwealth aircrew and 600,000 Germans died in the course of the RAF's attempt to win the war by bombing. The struggle in the air began weekly in 1939 with only a few Whitleys, Hampdens, and Wellingtons flying blindly through the night on their ill-conceived bombing runs. It ended six years later with 1,600 Lancasters, Halifaxes, and Mosquitoes, equipped with the best of British wartime technology, bombing whole German cities in a single night. Bomber Command, through its fits and starts, grew into an effective fighting force. In Bomber Command, originally published to critical acclaim in the U.K., famed British military historian Sir Max Hastings offers a captivating analysis of the strategy and decision-making behind one of World War II's most violent episodes. With firsthand descriptions of the experiences of aircrew from 1939 to 1945 - based on one hundred interviews with veterans - and a harrowing narrative of the experiences of Germans on the ground during the September 1944 bombing of Darmstadt, Bomber Command is widely recognized as a classic account of one of the bloodiest campaigns in World War II history. Now back in print in the U.S., this book is an essential addition to any history reader's bookshelf. The RAF in the Battle of France and the Battle of Britain-Greg Baughen 2017-09-15 In May 1940, the opposing German and Allied forces seemed reasonably well matched. On the ground, the four allied nations had more troops, artillery and tanks. Even in the air, the German advantage in numbers was slight. Yet two months later, the Allied armies had been crushed. The Netherlands, Belgium and France had all surrendered and Britain stood on her own, facing imminent defeat. Subsequent accounts of the campaign have tended to see this outcome as predetermined, with the seeds of defeat sown long before the fighting began. Was it so inevitable? Should the RAF have done more to help the Allied armies? Why was there such a small proportion of the RAF's frontline strength committed to the crucial battle on the ground? Could Fighter Command have done more to protect the British and French troops being evacuated from the beaches of Dunkirk? This study looks at the operations flown and takes a fresh look at the fatal decisions made behind the scenes, decisions that unnecessarily condemned RAF aircrew to an unequal struggle and ultimately ensured Allied defeat. What followed became the RAF's finest hour with victory achieved by the narrowest of margins. Or was it, as some now suggest, a victory that was always inevitable? If so, how was the German military juggernaut that had conquered most of Europe so suddenly halted? This study looks at the decisions and mistakes made by both sides. It explains how the British obsession with bomber attacks on cities had led to the development of the wrong type of fighter force and how only a fortuitous sequence of events enabled Fighter Command to prevail. It also looks at how ready the RAF was to deal with an invasion. How much air support could the British Army have expected? Why were hundreds of American combat planes and experienced Polish and Czech pilots left on the sidelines? And when the Blitz began, and Britain finally got the war it was expecting, what did this campaign tell us about the theories on air power that had so dominated pre-war air policy? All these questions and more are answered in Greg Baughen's third book. Baughen describes the furious battles between the RAF and the Luftwaffe and the equally bitter struggle between the Air Ministry and the War Office - and explains how close Britain really came to defeat in the summer of 1940. Air Power in the Age of Total War-John Buckley 2006-05-09 Warfare in the first half of the 20th century was fundamentally and irrevocably altered by the birth and subsequent development of air power. This work assesses the role of air power in changing the face of battle on land and sea. Utilizing late-1990s research, the author demonstrates that the phenomenon of air power was both a cause and a crucial accelerating factor contributing to the theory and practice of total war. For instance, the expansion of warfare to the homefront was a direct result of bombing and indirectly due to the extent of national economic mobilization required to support first rate air power status. In addition, the move away from the principle of total war with the onset of the Cold War and the replacement of air power by ICBMs is thoroughly examined. This work should provide students of international history, war studies, defence and strategic studies with an insight into 20th-century warfare. Implementing New Strategy In Combat: Ira C. Eaker 1942-1943-Colonel Ivo M. de Jong 2014-08-15 Most strategies have to be proven in combat. And more often than not, these strategies do not survive the realities of contact with the enemy. How do strategic leaders deal with this? What is their role in implementing the strategy and when do they face the inevitable and adapt their original strategy? A vital component of the United States' strategy at the outbreak of World War II was a bombing offensive against Germany. It was assumed that unescorted but heavily armed bombers could find their way to specific industrial targets, and could bomb these with great accuracy. However, in 1943 this strategy was proven to be untenable. With rapid adaptations not only to its strategy but also within its operational and tactical domains, the Eighth Air Force overcame the problems, managed to continue its daylight campaign and achieved success. This paper will look at the leadership displayed at the strategic level by Brigadier General Ira C. Eaker during the vital first eighteen months of combat operations. It will examine the agility and adaptability of Eaker and his organization as they gained experience and will focus on Eaker's prime areas of interest: leadership, public relations and the availability of resources. Terror from The Sky-Igor Primoratz 2010 "This is an interesting, informative, and important work. Overall, the quality of the essays is very high, and the focus of the book is on a topic of great importance. " \* Stephen Nathanson, Northeastern University This first interdisciplinary study of this contentious subject, leading experts in politics, history, and philosophy examine the complex aspects of the terror bombing of German cities during World War II. The contributors address the decision to embark on the bombing campaign, the moral issues raised by the bombing, and the main stages of the campaign and its effects on German civilians as well as on Germany's war effort. The book places the bombing campaign within the context of the history of air warfare, presenting the bombing as the first stage of the particular type of state terrorism that led to Hiroshima and Nagasaki and brought about the Cold War era "balance of terror." In doing so, it makes an important contribution to current debates about terrorism. It also analyzes the public debate in Germany about the historical, moral, and political significance of the deliberate killing of up to 600,000 German civilians by the British and American air forces. This pioneering collaboration provides a platform for a wide range of views-some of which are controversial-on a highly topical, painful, and morally challenging subject. Igor Primoratz is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, and Professorial Fellow at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Canberra. His publications include Banquos Geist: Hegels Theorie der Strafe (Bouvier, 1986), Justifying Legal Punishment (Humanities Press, 1989, 1997), and Ethics and Sex ( Routledge, 1999), and a number of edited books, including Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) and Civilian Immunity in War (Oxford University Press, 2007). Bomber In British Strategy Air Force Doctrine Nuclear Strategy And Britains World Role 1945 1960 Yeah, reviewing a books bomber in british strategy air force doctrine nuclear strategy and britains world role 1945 1960 could build up your near contacts listings. This is just one of the solutions for you to be successful. As understood, carrying out does not suggest that you have astounding points. Comprehending as competently as bargain even more than extra will allow each success. bordering to, the proclamation as well as acuteness of this bomber in british strategy air force doctrine nuclear strategy and britains world role 1945 1960 can be taken as with ease as picked to act.
Bomber In British Strategy Air Force Doctrine Nuclear Strategy And Britains World Role 1945 1960